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	No answer expected or required
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United States Senate

87-4058X

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 30, 1987

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Secretary of State Shultz has stated that "two of the fundamental principles that should form the basis of all arms control negotiations are equality and verifiability." We agree. As you complete negotiations on an Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) arms control treaty, we urge you to keep the following concerns about equality and verifiability in mind.

Any INF Treaty should provide for true equality of forces and rights, which would be best achieved by agreement on global zero in all INF forces. Any INF Treaty should also include equal and verifiable limits on Short Range INF systems, and a provision to allow NATO compensatory deployment of SRINF forces for deterrence as necessary.

Moreover, any INF Treaty should specify effective verification, including on-site inspection of suspect sites of stockpiled missiles on demand. For example, the State Department has stated that "in addition to the approximately 440 SS-20 missiles now deployed, there may be as many as 200-400 (or more) such missiles in the USSR's inventory." These stockpiled missiles and launchers should be accounted for and dismantled.

Futhermore, any INF Treaty should establish a clear timetable for the verified destruction of deployed INF and SRINF systems which equalizes force levels first, and only then imposes a simultaneous draw-down of weapons. This is because the Soviets greatly outgun us. We must therefore first let them reduce to our level to achieve equality, then provide for enforcement before we irrevocably begin destroying our few launchers to achieve equality at zero.

Finally, we hope that you will try to convince the Soviets that their continued support for Marxist regimes involved in regional conflicts could make it more difficult for the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of any INF Treaty.

James a. Millure Walcolm

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Letter to the President on INF treaty, July 30, 1987

## Copies to:

Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, JCS
Director, DIA
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Director, ACDA